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In July 1918, a Bolshevik commissar pointed to the lack of controls over the Cheka 
security organs and warned that unless the party limited the Cheka's powers, "We shall 
have a state within a state.'(1) Seventy-four years later Vadim Bakatin, the man who 
tried to dismantle the KGB as the Soviet Union disintegrated around it, looked back at 
his failed effort and remarked that the Cheka's heir had indeed become a "state within a 
state."(2)
Bureaucratic reshufflings and name changes since the Soviet collapse have brought 
little real reform of the organs, whose officers continue to call themselves "chekists." 
President Boris Yel'tsin saw it in his interests not to erase the old legacy by screening 
security personnel and building entirely new services (as the Czech government did in 
1990), but to use the former KGB as one of his main bases of support. He felt that he 
could keep the organs in check by splitting them into several services and by placing 
the internal security apparatus, known as the Ministry of Security, under the control of 
officers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).
Yel'tsin's Heavy Reliance on Security Services
Instead of producing the stability that Yel'tsin sought, the arrangement appeared to 
make the organs even less controllable. In his escalating rivalry with Vice President 
Aleksandr Rutskoi and Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov and in his 
attempts to appease the conflicting interests of the entrenched military-industrial 
complex and bureaucracy, Yel'tsin alienated his reformist political support base and 
found himself having to rely increasingly on the security "organs."
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This reliance culminated in the September 1993 suspension of the Supreme Soviet and 
the armed confrontation of October 4, in which the chekists--more so than the army-- 
saved Yel'tsin's presidency.(3) However, their last-minute support was reluctant and it 
was clear that many within the organs were extremely resentful of the president.
Stung by his political losses in the December parliamentary elections, using the slim 
mandate for his new constitution, and complaining publicly that state security had not 
supported him sufficiently, Yel'tsin moved immediately to reorganize the organs once 
more. He tried to splinter them further into separate, smaller agencies which reported 
directly to him through a newly created national security adviser post in the presidential 
apparat, occupied by former Grachev confidant Yuriy Baturin.(4) Yel'tsin also expanded 
the authority and staff of the Security Council, a presidential body responsible for 
coordinating internal, economic, and foreign policies. The Security Council's degree of 
control over the security, intelligence, and military services is an open question.
Lessons not Learned
Yel'tsin and his top aides recognized that the main problem of the security organs was 
their nature; regardless of how they were to be organized, the security services would 
remain a fraternity of conspiratorially minded officers bonded by the checkist legacy in 
which their entire training and careers were immersed. As the presidential confidant 
Gennadiy Burbulis remarked, "The results show that we made a mistake when we did 
not disband the state security agencies after August 1991."(5)
The president was even more specific. On 21 December he issued a decree abolishing 
the Ministry of Security, calling it "unreformable." In a remarkable admission, Yel'tsin's 
decree recognized the continuity with chekism and the shallowness of all previous 
reforms:
 The system of bodies of the VChK-OGPU-NKVD-MGB-KGB-MB [All-Russian 
Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage (Cheka)-United 
State Political Directorate-People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs-Ministry of State 
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Security-Committee for State Security-Ministry of Security] has proved unreformable. 
The attempts at reorganization that have been made in recent years were basically 
superficial and cosmetic. Up to the present moment the Russian Ministry of Security 
lack a strategic concept of ensuring Russia's security.. Counterintelligence work has 
deteriorated. The system of political investigation has been mothballed and could easily 
be recreated.
 Against the background of the democratic and constitutional reformation taking place in 
Russia, the existing system of ensuring Russia's security has outlived itself; it is 
ineffective, burdensome for the state budget, and a restraining factor in the 
implementation of political and economic reforms.(6)
 Yel'tsin's decree was astonishing in that it summarized exactly what democratic critics 
such as Sergei Grigoryants, Lev Ponomarev, Gleb Yakunin and Galina Starovoitova had 
been saying all along. Yet the president repeated the mistake he made after the August 
1991 putsch. He issued the decrees but failed to follow through; the chekists once again 
took advantage of the power vacuum and reasserted themselves.
Reorganization and Revanchism
Since August 1991, the reorganization processes have been fluid and changes have 
been sudden. President Yel'tsin's strategy has been to preserve the chekist structures 
but to dilute their ability to act against him by dividing them into five major organizations 
and by transferring some units to other ministries. Brief sketches follow.
Federal Counterintelligence Service (FKS). The legal successor to the Ministry of 
Security (which was abolished shortly after the December 1993 elections), the FKS is 
responsible for counterintelligence operations, provision of counterintelligence to 
government agencies, military counterintelligence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, 
and combating corruption in the top echelons of government.(7)
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The service is currently directed by Sergei Stepashin, a veteran of the MVD who was 
formerly chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security, 
and who after the 1991 putsch was named Deputy Chairman of the KGB. Considered a 
moderate who wanted to preserve chekist structures by making them more efficient, 
Stepashin has surrounded himself with members of the old guard. His deputies in the 
FKS include Valeriy Timofeyev, former KGB chief of Gorkiy (now again Nizhniy 
Novgorod); Aleksandr Strelkov, who until 1992 was responsible for the gulag system in 
Russia; and Igor Mezhakov, a former officer of the KGB Fifth Chief Directorate 
responsible for political repression, who is now in charge of personnel.(8)
Top-heavy with 227 generals, the FKS reportedly will be reduced in size from the official 
figure of 139,900 officers to 75,000; most of the reduction will come from transfers to 
other services. The figures do not include clerical and support staff, academic and 
scientific personnel, military medical personnel, guards or maintenance staff.(9)
Stepashin affirmed that the FKS would maintain the old KGB agent networks, and was 
adamant that the identities of the past KGB collaborators would never be made public. 
He also stated--despite Yel'tsin's public decree--that the FKS would continue to conduct 
domestic spying operations against Russian citizens based on their political beliefs.(10)
Though ostensibly aimed at potentially violent extremists, Stepashin's affirmation of 
political spying casts chills on reformers, especially those who strongly criticize the 
continued chekist nature of the security organs. He lashed out at "enemies" in the 
democratic movement such as former prisoner of conscience Sergei Grigoryants 
because of their efforts to expose KGB excesses and to demand real reforms.(11)
Main Guard Directorate. A personal army (bodyguard), surveillance force, and special 
operations unit under sole control of the president, the Main Guard Directorate (Glavnoe 
upravlenie okhrany) has the former KGB Ninth (Guards) Directorate as its core. It is 
headed by KGB Lt. Gen. Mikhail Barsukov, who also holds the rank of minister and 
Commandant of the Kremlin. The directorate includes the 5,000-man former KGB 
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Kremlin Guard,(12) its own intelligence and counterintelligence forces, the elite Alfa 
spetsnaz unit formerly of the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, and other special 
troops for a total of 25,000 uniformed personnel. The directorate is also in charge of 
security for government office buildings, including the Parliament and the Constitutional 
Court. It has taken on so many functions, including security of the Rozvooruzhenie state 
weapons export firm, that the president had to create a special Presidential Security 
Service headed by KGB veteran Aleksandr Korzhakov.(13)
The Okhrana, as critics are calling it in reference to the tsarist security force, wields 
immense political patronage by controlling many perks of power, including the 
government limousine fleet, health facilities, stores, tailor shops, special 
communications installations, and other services. Control of these privileges alarmed 
the Acting Constitutional Court Chairman Nikolai Virtuk, who summarized his concerns 
thus, "On the one hand Minister Barsukov is supposed to take orders from the premier 
and his vice premiers. But on the other hand, it is on him that all of them depend.''(14)
Federal Border Service. The renamed KGB Border Guards Chief Directorate, the 
Federal Border Service is approximately 180,000 strong, or three-fourths its Soviet-era 
strength. The organization does not merely guard the air and sea borders of the 
Russian Federation, but serves as a combat force to guard the hard-line communist 
government of Tajikistan (which has no contiguous borders with Russia), and it is an 
unwelcome presence in several former Soviet republics such as Georgia. To break any 
possible chain of command that might autonomously develop from the Ministry of 
Security, Yel'tsin named an army officer, Col. Gen. Andrei Nikolayev, as its chief.(15)
Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information. Known by its 
Russian initials FAPSI(Federalnoe agentstvo pravitelstvennoi sviazi i informatsii), the 
organization mainly comprises the KGB Eighth Chief Directorate responsible for 
cryptography and signals intelligence, and the Communication Troops. FAPSI likes to 
compare itself to the National Security Agency of the United States, but its powers are 
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much greater. In addition to foreign intelligence functions, it controls the internal 
electronic communications of the Russian government.
Referring to information and communications systems as "society's strategic resource," 
FAPSI Director Aleksander V. Starovoitov, a KGB lieutenant general, deplored the 
proliferation of Western-installed computer systems and developed an initiative to 
increase "state control.. . over the information and communication sector." This move 
was denounced by journalists who said it would "bring all flows of information back to 
'former KGB channels.'"(16)
Earlier this year FAPSI won a year-long battle with the Information Resources 
Directorate of the presidential staff to control a "single information space" in the upper 
levels of the
Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States governments, by persuading 
Yel'tsin to abolish the civilian directorate and transfer it to the chekist electronic service. 
(17)'
External Intelligence Service. The External Intelligence Service (Sluzhba vneshnei 
razvedki, SVR) is the former KGB First Chief Directorate. The SVR has been 
restructured to reflect Russia's changed strategic priorities, and the fact that its main 
client is no longer the former CPSU International Department. It has made much 
propaganda out of its staff reductions, the closure of 30 to 40 rezidenturas around the 
world (mostly in small Third World countries of little or no strategic value),and personnel 
cuts at important posts such as the Russian Embassy in Washington. These cuts may 
be misleading, since the huge interchange between East and West permits the SVR to 
run its foreign agents from Russian territory instead of following the riskier traditional 
practice of servicing agents where they could be monitored by Western 
counterintelligence. As the Aldrich Ames case shows, the SVR maintains its aggressive 
espionage activity against the West.
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Commercial and economic espionage were carried out aggressively by the chekists 
since the early 1920s, and the SVR has shifted its emphasis increasingly toward these 
areas of espionage. The change is due partly to the fact that President Yel'tsin has 
made the strategic decision to use the organs of power to help the national economy, 
but the shift appears to be motivated more by the consideration that business-related 
spying brings in hard currency for the security organs themselves, as well as for the 
active duty, reserve and retired officers as individuals.(18)
Penetration of Society
The chekists emerged from the Soviet collapse with a great advantage over ordinary 
citizens and even much of the nomenklatura. They had banks of information at their 
disposal and connections throughout the former USSR and around the world. They 
knew better than the rest of their countrymen how to operate in a Western political and 
business environment. And, even though they were governed ostensibly by new 
legislation, they are the law.
Like a cluster bomb which spews large numbers of tiny bomblets, the KGB, when 
broken into smaller parts, penetrates all aspects of life. Whereas under the communist 
party the organs were strictly controlled from the top down, those controls seem to have 
evaporated. The chekists have taken on a life of their own, unaccountable to anyone, 
yet relatively unified as a closed fraternity.
As soon as Mikhail Gorbachev abolished the CPSU's monopoly of power, the KGB 
rushed to fill in the void. Prior to the 1990 elections for the Congress of People's 
Deputies in Russia and the other republics, the KGB set up a special task force to 
organize and manipulate the electoral processes. It conducted training courses in 
political organization for its favored candidates, and provided them with privileged 
political and economic information concerning their constituencies and, presumably, 
their rivals. Open KGB officers, 2, 756 in all, ran in republican federal, regional and local 
parliamentary races across the USSR with 86 percent of them winning in the first round. 
In the Russian Federation, 57 percent of the 630 overt KGB officers who ran won the 
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first round.(19) Several of them occupied prominent positions in the federal Supreme 
Soviet. These figures do not include covert KGB "citizen agents" and other co-opted 
individuals, whose numbers are unknown. KGB support for ultranationalist Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky has been widely reported,(20) but a spokesman for the Federal 
Counterintelligence Service observed, "A number of the present democratic leaders 
were KGB agents, too.''(21)
Chekists have dominated much of the booming business community in Russia. 
According to one report, KGB officers are involved in 80 percent of all joint ventures.(22) 
They hold prominent positions in most of Russia's stock and mercantile exchanges, and 
in major financial institutions. To accommodate the desire of many officers to go into 
business, Yel'tsin authorized in 1992 a new service status called "active reserve."(23) As 
an active reservist, a state security officer can maintain his profession and the privileges 
it offers while going into the private sector. This situation completely erases whatever 
distinctions there may have been between a government security official and a private 
businessman.
In the rough world of Russian business where few contracts have any legal basis, 
employing chekists has its advantages. The organs also find it advantageous for its 
officers to go into business. The giant construction and financial firm Most ("Bridge") 
reportedly employs more than 800 former KGB officers. Its 60-man analytical 
department is composed almost entirely of KGB personnel (including former KGB 
Chairman Viktor Chebrikov), and is chaired by Filip Bobkov, former first deputy 
chairman of the USSR
MOST is now moving into the mass media. It is a major financial backer of the 
Independent Television Company (NTV), which airs the popular "Donahue"-style 
program "Itogi" hosted by former KGB officer Yevgeni Kiselev, and of the liberal 
newspaper Segodnya. Both news organizations, reports the Financial Times, reflect the 
institutional biases of their financial backers.(25) Indeed, Segodnya has been among 
the harshest attackers of Russians such as human rights figure Sergei Grigoryants and 
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dissident chemist Vil Mirzayanov, who demanded radical reform of the security organs.
(26)
What appears to be emerging is a huge parastatal system dominated by the former 
KGB, the nomenklatura, and organized crime. Former KGB Major General Oleg 
Kalugin, a critic of the security organs, noted recently a large "underground racketeer 
group" that "is headed and staffed by former KGB." He remarked, "Criminals have 
already conquered the heights of state--with the chief of the KGB as head of a mafia 
group," an apparent reference to former Security Minister Viktor Barannikov.
Organized crime figures have become so powerful in Russia that they join the same 
circles as the civil authorities. Otari Kvantrishvili, a known Moscow gangster who was 
assassinated in April, had positioned himself so that he "could successfully settle 
conflicts that occurred between Moscow officials, financiers, and representatives of the 
underworld. Therefore, on the one hand, many criminal authorities were among his pals; 
on the other, top officials in militsiya, actors, sportsmen [and] politicians." He even aided 
a fund to help Moscow police officers and their families.(27)'
Conclusion
The chekists today hold most of the major levers of power in Russia. Their official duties 
include foreign and domestic intelligence, counterintelligence, military and police 
counterintelligence, electronic communications, border guards and customs, tax 
investigation and enforcement, political patronage, and fighting organized crime and 
drug trafficking. These duties neatly complement their firm penetration of the political 
process, and their new entry into the country's economic and commercial structures. In 
many ways the distinction is being erased between the security services, on the one 
hand, and government, business, and crime, on the other hand.
Boris Yel'tsin is largely to blame. He made the decision to preserve the KGB at a time 
when he had the political capital required to do away with it. His new constitution, which 
created a weak parliament, allows for few functioning checks and balances. His term as 
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president expires in two years, but he will leave behind no institutions upon which a 
working democratic government can be built.
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